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This paper proposes a new method of estimating the Taylor rule with
a time-varying implicit inﬂation target and a time-varying natural rate
of interest. The inﬂation target and the natural rate are modelled as
random walks and are estimated using maximum likelihood and the
Kalman ﬁlter. I apply this method to U.S. monetary policy over the
last 25 years to understand how the Federal Reserve’s target has varied
during this broadly successful period. Stability tests indicate signiﬁcant
time variation in the implicit target. In the early 1980s, during the
Volcker disinﬂation, the inﬂation target is near 3%. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the target is close to actual inﬂation of 3-4% and only
declines once the 1990-91 recession reduces inﬂation to 1-2%, corrobo-
rating historical evidence of an “opportunistic approach to disinﬂation.”
Finally, over 2001-2004, the target rises to 2-3%, behaviour that can be
interpreted as a response the risks of hitting the zero bound on nominal
interest rates.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 25 years, inﬂation in the U.S. has declined from double digits
in the 1970s to close to 1% by the early 2000s. An important question is:
*I am grateful to Laurence Ball, Thomas Lubik, Athanasios Orphanides, Adam Posen
and Jonathan Wright for helpful comments.how has the Federal Reserve conducted monetary policy during this broadly
successful period?
A large literature on monetary policy rules has addressed this question by
measuring how policy interest rates react to deviations of inﬂation and real
activity from their target levels. The accepted wisdom is that, since 1979,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has responded to increases
in inﬂation above the target level by raising the real fed funds rate above
its natural rate, in accordance with the Taylor principle. There is also a
consensus that the Fed has responded to deviations of output from potential.
Other things being equal, when output falls below potential, the Fed lowers
the real fed funds rate below its natural rate. 1
An important assumption in the policy rules literature is that the natural
rate of interest rate and the target level of inﬂation are constant for the du-
ration of the sample period. For example, Clarida et al. (1998) estimate the
Federal Reserve’s policy reaction function over the 1979-1994 period under
the assumption of a constant inﬂation target and concludes that the target
has been 4% over this period. This estimate is based on the assumption
that the natural rate of interest has been constant at 3.5%.
However, given the growing evidence that the natural rate of interest is
aﬀected by factors such as productivity growth and that it has varied over
the past 25 years, the assumption of a constant natural rate seems unduly
restrictive. For example, Laubach and Williams (2003) ﬁnd substantial vari-
1Orphanides (2002) ﬁnds that the Fed policy before 1979 was also consistent with the
Taylor principle and that the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s arose because policymakers
had overestimated the degree of slack in the economy. However, this paper focusses
on the period of monetary history during which inﬂation was conquered. This period
started when Paul Volcker became Fed chairman in 1979Q3 and began a policy aimed at
eliminating inﬂation.
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ation in the natural rate of interest over the past four decades in the U.S.
The authors suggest that the natural rate varies about one-for-one with
changes in the growth rate of potential GDP.2
Regarding the inﬂation target, statements made by Federal Reserve pol-
icymakers over the quarter century suggest that the inﬂation objective has
also varied. Since the Federal Reserve does not have an explicit target and
since inﬂation has changed noticeably over the past 25 years, the assumption
of a constant target seems overly restrictive.
This paper therefore relaxes the assumption of a constant natural rate and
a constant inﬂation objective and proposes a new method of estimating the
Taylor rule when these parameters vary. First, I obtain an estimate of the
time-varying natural rate of interest using the Kalman ﬁlter and a model
that links the natural rate to changes in trend productivity growth and to a
random component, as in Laubach and Williams (2003). Secondly, I use this
estimate of the natural rate to estimate the time-varying inﬂation target in
the context of a forward-looking Taylor rule. I model the implicit inﬂation
target as a random walk and conduct the estimation using the Kalman ﬁlter
and the median-unbiased estimator proposed by Stock and Watson (1998).
My main ﬁndings are four: (i) stability tests indicate signiﬁcant time vari-
ation in the Federal Reserve’s implicit target over the 1979-2004 period; (ii)
in the early 1980s, the inﬂation target estimate is near 3%, indicating that
the Federal Reserve under Volcker sought to substantially reduce inﬂation
from its double digit level; (iii) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the tar-
get is close to actual inﬂation of 3-4% and declines to 1-2% only after the
2Maccini et al. (2003) identify long-run changes (regime shifts) in the natural rate with
low real rates in the 1970s and high rates in the early 1980s.4 DANIEL LEIGH
1990-91 recession reduces inﬂation, a ﬁnding that corroborates qualitative
historical evidence of an “opportunistic approach to disinﬂation” at the Fed;
(iv) ﬁnally, over 2001-2004, the target rises to 2-3% a development that can
be interpreted as a response by the FOMC to the risks of hitting the zero
bound on nominal interest rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes my
methodology, Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis, Section 4
discusses the results, Section 5 reports the results of a robustness analysis,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. METHODOLOGY
In this section, I describe the Taylor rule model of monetary policy and
explain my estimation approach.
The Taylor Rule Model
The Taylor rule model assumes that central banks respond in a system-
atic fashion to deviations of expected inﬂation from the desired level. For
instance, when the inﬂation forecast rises above the target, the Taylor rule
prescribes raising nominal interest rates enough to raise real interest rates
(the so-called “Taylor principle”). The rule also allows for some output
stabilization by prescribing lower interest rates when output falls below po-
tential. The central bank has a target for the nominal interest rate that
evolves according to the following equation.
i∗
t = rn + πe
t +( β − 1)(πe
t − π∗)+γ˜ yt (1)ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 5
where i∗
t is the target level of the fed funds rate, πe
t is expected inﬂation (the
inﬂation forecast), ˜ yt is the output gap (the percentage diﬀerence between
actual and potential real GDP), rn is the natural rate of interest and π∗ is
the inﬂation target.
An important condition for the Taylor rule to stabilize inﬂation is β>1,
i.e. when the inﬂation forecast rises above target, the policymaker raises




t. Other things being equal, the central bank thus responds
to increases in inﬂation above target by raising the target for the real fed
funds rate above the natural rate, i.e. the real rate gap, r∗
t − rn, responds
positively to the inﬂation gap, πe
t −π∗. This condition is called the “Taylor
principle.” Output stabilization, or “leaning against the wind,” implies a
positive value for γ.
The conventional approach to estimating Taylor rules assumes a constant
natural rate of interest, rn, and a constant inﬂation target, π∗. Equation
(1) can thus be rewritten as:
i∗
t = α + βπe
t + γ˜ yt (2)
where the composite intercept term, α = rn − (β − 1)π∗, comprises both
the constant natural rate and the constant inﬂation target. By estimating
α and β and by making an assumption regarding the value of rn,o n ec a n






For example, Clarida et al. (1998) assume that rn equals 3.5%, the average
of the real fed funds rate over the 1979-1994 sample. Using their estimates
of α and β, the authors then obtain an estimate of π∗ =4 % .
I therefore relax the assumption of a constant natural rate and a constant
inﬂation objective and proposes a new method of estimating the Taylor rule
when these parameters vary.3 The distinguishing features of my approach
are: (i) I allow the inﬂation target, π∗, to vary over time; (ii) I allow the
natural rate of interest, rn, in the Taylor rule to vary over time; and (iii) I
use the Kalman ﬁlter and maximum likelihood to estimate the target and




t +( β − 1)(πe
t − π∗
t)+γ˜ yt (4)
where the t subscripts on the natural rate of interest and on the inﬂation
target indicate time variation.
Interest Rate Smoothing
A concern that arises when estimating Taylor rules such as those in equa-
tions (1) and (4) is that they do not account for the tendency of central
banks to smooth interest rate changes. Reasons for wishing to adjust inter-
est rates gradually in response to news include the possible loss of credibility
following sudden policy reversals, as discussed in Clarida et al. (1998). Fol-
lowing the literature, I therefore assume that the central bank adjusts the
actual nominal interest rate, it, gradually towards i∗
t, the target fed funds
3Leigh (2004) applies this approach to Japanese monetary policy over the 1979-2004
period.
4Boivin (2004) allows for time-variation in the intercept term, α, and in the response
coeﬃcients. My approach is substantially diﬀerent, I separately model time variation in
r
n and π
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rate:
it =( 1− ρ)i∗
t + ρit−1 +  0,t (5)
where i∗




The ﬁrst stage in my analysis is to estimate the time-varying natural
rate, rn
t . To obtain an estimate of the natural rate, I apply the Kalman
ﬁlter approach of Laubach and Williams (2003). The LW model links the
natural rate to changes in the trend growth rate of GDP and to a random
component. The authors report results for a baseline case where the natural
rate of interest follows a random walk as well as for the case where it is
stationary. I use the simpler baseline case.6
The basic identifying assumption is that the output gap converges to zero
if the real rate gap is zero. This assumption is formalized in the following
I.S. curve equation.
yt = y∗
t + Ay(L)(yt−1 − y∗
t−1)+Ar(L)(rt−1 − rn
t−1)+ 1,t (6)
where yt is the log of GDP and y∗
t is the log of potential GDP. The diﬀerence
between actual and potential GDP, i.e. yt − y∗
t is the output gap.
In the LW framework, the inﬂation rate depends on lags of inﬂation, rel-
ative oil and non-oil import price inﬂation, and the output gap. This rela-
5There is also an econometric motivation for the lagged interest rate in equation (5).
An important assumption in the maximum likelihood estimation framework is that the
exogenous random shock to the interest rate,  0,t, is serially uncorrelated. Adding the
lagged interest rate term helps to ensure that this assumption holds.
6Details of the approach are provided in the appendix.8 DANIEL LEIGH
tionship is formalized by a Phillips curve.
πt = Bπ(L)πt−1 + By(L)(yt−1 − y∗
t−1)+Bπ(L)xt +  2,t (7)
where xt is the data matrix containing the relative oil and non-oil import
price inﬂation series. Thus, stable inﬂation is consistent with both the real
interest rate and output equaling their respective natural rates. The terms
 1,t and  2,t denote mean zero i.i.d. normal shocks.
Figure 1 shows the one-sided and two-sided estimates of the natural rate
(Kalman ﬁlter and smoother, respectively). In the one-sided case (dashed
line), the natural rate estimate in period t is based only on data up to period
t and thus simulates estimation in real-time. I therefore use this one-sided
measure of the natural rate in my subsequent Taylor rule analysis. The
smooth two-sided estimate of the natural rate in period t i sb a s e do nd a t a
from the entire sample.7 Figure 1 also shows the real Funds rate (thick solid
line).
The path of the natural rate of interest in Figure 1 is intuitive and cor-
roborated by historical evidence. In the 1980s, the natural rate is relatively
high at about 3%. This ﬁnding is in line with the notion that the large
deﬁcits of the 1980s translated into higher real interest rates. The decline
in the natural rate during the 1991 recession can be interpreted as resulting
from an I.S. curve shift associated with the credit crunch. Finally, the real
rate rises again during the late 1990s when productivity growth increased.
7The estimates of the model parameters are from data for the full sample so the analogy
to real-time is not exact.ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 9
FIG. 1. Real Federal Funds Rate and the Natural Rate of Interest
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Estimating π∗
t
Once I have estimated the time-varying natural rate of interest, I estimate
the time-varying implicit inﬂation target, π∗
t and the remaining Taylor rule




t +( β − 1)(πe
t − π∗
t)+γ˜ yt (8)
it =( 1− ρ)i∗
t + ρit−1 +  0,t (9)
π∗
t = π∗
t−1 +  3,t (10)10 DANIEL LEIGH
Equation (10) models the implicit inﬂation target as a random walk, where
 3,t is another mean zero i.i.d. normal disturbance that is uncorrelated with
 0,t. Modelling the inﬂation target as a random walk allows the target to
change gradually. Rather than assuming that π∗
t changes gradually, one
could allow it to experience sudden discrete changes. However, there is no
reason ap r i o r ito prefer a discrete break speciﬁcation to a gradual change
model for the time period in question. Also, estimates of break dates in such
a model would be measured with considerable uncertainty. 8
In estimating this system, the ﬁrst step is to estimate the variance of  1,
i.e. the variance of the innovation to the implicit inﬂation target, σ2
 3. The
contribution of this variance to overall variability in the data is likely to be
very small. As a result, the maximum likelihood estimate of σ2
 3 is biased
towards zero. This “pile-up problem” discussed in Stock (1994) implies that





is also biased towards zero.
To overcome this problem, I estimate λ following the method of Stock
and Watson (1998) that is not biased towards zero. The method consists of
conducting the sup-Wald structural break test for a break in the intercept of
the Taylor rule with a constant π∗ (but with a time-varying rn
t ). One then
compares the test statistic to the table of critical values in Stock and Watson
(1998) and retrieves the implied median-unbiased estimate of λ together with
its 90% conﬁdence interval.
Next, I use this value of λ to estimate the Taylor rule. I assume that
the disturbances  0,t and  3,t are mutually uncorrelated. I then use maxi-
8The assumption that time-varying unobserved coeﬃcients change gradually has been
used in other applications of the Kalman ﬁlter such as in the estimation of the NAIRU
a n do ft h en a t u r a lr a t eo fi n t e r e s t .ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 11
mum likelihood and the Kalman ﬁlter to obtain estimates of the parameters
{β,γ,ρ,σ2
 0} and of π∗
t, as described in Harvey (1989). Standard errors are
obtained using the delta method.
To obtain an initial estimate of the state variable, π∗
0, in 1979Q3, I refer
to statements made by Paul Volcker, Fed Chairman at the time. From
1979 to 1982, the Federal Reserve conducted an aggressive disinﬂationary
policy and successfully reduced inﬂation from double digits to 4% by the
mid 1980s. As Tobin (2002) explains, “Volcker then declared victory over
inﬂation and piloted the economy through its long 1980s recovery” (Tobin,
2002). Inﬂation remained near 4% until the early 1990s.
Therefore, a plausible value of the Fed’s inﬂation target in 1979, at the
start of the Volcker disinﬂation, is π∗
0 = 4%. Moreover, as Section 5 explains,
the results are robust to alternative methods of initializing π∗
0. Speciﬁcally,
the path of the estimated target after the ﬁrst few years of the sample is
very similar for a range of values for π∗
0. The estimates of the Taylor rule
coeﬃcients are also similar.9
3. DATA
In this section, I describe the data series used in the analysis.
Inﬂation
My measure of inﬂation is the annualized quarterly growth rate of the
price index for personal consumption expenditures excluding food and en-
9I initialize the remaining Taylor rule parameters using OLS, as in Hamilton (1994). I
estimate the Taylor rule with a constant π
∗ (but a time-varying r
n
t ) using OLS and the
full sample. I then conduct the maximum likelihood estimation starting from the initial
OLS estimates of the parameters {β,γ,ρ,σ
2
 0}.12 DANIEL LEIGH
ergy, referred to as core PCE inﬂation. This rate is, as many authors suggest,
the Federal Reserve’s preferred inﬂation indicator. Expected inﬂation, πe
t,i s
the expectation of average inﬂation over the four quarters ahead. Following
Laubach and Williams (2003), the expectations are based on out-of-sample
forecasts using an univariate AR(3) with a 40-quarter rolling-regression win-
dow. Speciﬁcally, the variable (
Pt+4
Pt −1) is forecast using ( Pt
Pt−1 −1) and two
lags of ( Pt
Pt−1 − 1) where Pt is the level of the core PCE index in quarter t.
The source of the data is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Nominal Interest Rate
The nominal policy interest rate is the annualized federal funds rate. The
source of the fed funds rate data is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Output Gap
My output gap series is the real-time estimate of the output gap taken from
the Greenbooks of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The Greenbook
estimates are produced by economists at the Board of Governors before each
meeting of the FOMC. Federal Reserve staﬀ use a variety of techniques to
estimate the output gap, such as measuring the potential level of output
using a production function and then subtracting this estimate of potential
from the actual level of output.10
Importantly, in any given quarter, the Fed staﬀ base their real-time es-
timate of the output gap only on information that has accumulated up to
that quarter. The Greenbook estimates thus represent the latest informa-
10For a discussion of techniques used to estimate the output gap, see Haltmaier (2001).ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 13
tion that policymakers have available to them when they take interest rate
decisions.
Using real-time output gap data distinguishes this paper from much of
the empirical work on policy rules. The canonical approach is to use retro-
spective (ex post) output gap data that were not available to policy makers
in real time. For example, the output gap data used in Clarida et al. (1998)
are obtained by ﬁrst ﬁtting a quadratic trend to the entire output series and
then subtracting this trend from the actual level of output. However, as Or-
phanides (2001) argues, analysing policy rules using real-time data rather
than retrospective data provides a more plausible estimate of policymakers’
intended reactions to the economy.11
The Greenbook output gap data are available for the period ending in
1995Q4.12 For 1996-2004, the Greenbook data are unavailable. I therefore
supplement the Greenbook series with the Congressional Budget Oﬃce out-
put gap estimates. The CBO output gaps are estimated using a production
function approach and are similar to the Greenbook output gaps in the pe-
riods in which both series are available.13 Figure 2 displays the output gap
series.
4. RESULTS
In this Section, I discuss the results of my Taylor rule analysis of the
1979Q3-2004Q1 period.
11Using real-time data to estimate the policy reaction function is an approach adopted
by Orphanides (2001), Boivin (2003) and Kuttner (2004), among others.
12I am grateful to Anathasios Orphanides for providing me with the Greenbook output
gap data that he has compiled for the period ending 1995Q4.
13For a detailed explanation of the CBO output gap estimation procedure, see Arnold
(2004).14 DANIEL LEIGH
FIG. 2. The Output Gap


















4.1. Estimates of the Signal-to-Noise Ratio






hypothesis of H0 : λ = 0 is rejected at the 1% level, indicating statistically
signiﬁcant time variation in π∗
t over the sample period. The median unbiased
estimate of λ is 0.15 with a 90% conﬁdence of (0.06,0.51).
Although the estimate of λ is imprecise, the results are robust to using
an alternative value within the 90% conﬁdence interval. The robustness
analysis in Section 5 suggests that the Taylor rule parameter estimates areESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 15
TABLE 1.














similar for diﬀerent choices of λ. The paths of the time-varying target, π∗
t,
are also similar for diﬀerent choices of λ.
4.2. Taylor Rule Parameter Estimates
In this subsection, I discuss the estimates of the Taylor rule parameters
displayed in Table 1. The estimate of the inﬂation response is 3.1, suggesting
that the Fed has responded actively to the inﬂation gap during the 1979-2004
period. The estimate of β is signiﬁcantly greater than one, in accordance
with the Taylor principle.14
The output response coeﬃcient in Table 1 is 0.7 suggesting that the Fed
has been pursuing output stabilization. At 0.7, the estimate of ρ shows
evidence of a signiﬁcant degree of interest rate inertia.
14This value of β =3 .1 is higher than is generally found in the literature. For example,
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) obtain an estimate of β =2 .2 using the 1982-1997 sample
and the constant π
∗ and r
n framework. Adjusting my sample to end in 1997 as in Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) reduces my estimate of β slightly to 2.7. This suggests that the
Fed’s response to inﬂation may have increased during 1998-2004. However, I do not
investigate the issue of time-variation in β further here.16 DANIEL LEIGH
4.3. Estimates of the Implicit Target
In this subsection, I discuss the estimated path of the implicit inﬂation
target shown in Figure 3. We can divide the trajectory of π∗
t into four
sections: (i) the Volcker disinﬂation (1979 until the early 1980s); (ii) the
opportunistic approach to disinﬂation (mid 1980s to early 1990s); (iii) the
low inﬂation equilibrium (late 1990s); and (iv) the deﬂation scare (2001-
2004). The estimated path of π∗
t during these four periods is corroborated by
the qualitative historical evidence. In addition to the path of the estimated
implicit target, Figure 3 shows the 95% conﬁdence interval and actual PCE
inﬂation, i.e. average inﬂation over four quarters.15
4.3.1. The Volcker Disinﬂation
During the early 1980s, the implicit inﬂation target is near 3%. This
period is known as the Volcker disinﬂation when inﬂation fell from almost
double digits to 4% by the mid-1980s. The target drifts up slightly towards
the end of Volcker’s term as FOMC chairman but this movement is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3.2. The Opportunistic Approach to Disinﬂation
At the beginning of Greenspan’s term in 1987, the implicit inﬂation is in
the 3-4% range, i.e. very close to actual inﬂation. As inﬂation declines to
1-2% following the 1990-91 recession, however, the implicit target also falls
into the 1-2% range, reaching a minimum of 1.3% in 1996Q2.
15The 95% conﬁdence intervals are obtained from the estimate of the variance of the
Kalman smoother and corrected for parameter uncertainty following Ansley and Kohn
(1986).ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 17
FIG. 3. The Inﬂation Target
Volcker Greenspan





















The behaviour of π∗
t during this period can be interpreted as the “oppor-
tunistic approach to disinﬂation” that several authors and policymakers were
advocating at the time. Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) explain that under
the opportunistic approach, the Fed does not take deliberate anti-inﬂation
action but rather waits for “external circumstances such as favorable supply
shocks and unforeseen recessions to deliver the desired reduction in inﬂation”
(Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002, 1).18 DANIEL LEIGH
This strategy was endorsed by a number of monetary policymakers. In
1989, President Boehne of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia sug-
gested that, rather lowering inﬂation by tightening policy, the Fed should
wait for the next recession to lower inﬂation. Once inﬂation declined, Boehne
suggested that the Fed should seek to keep inﬂation at the lower level. As
Vice Chairman Blinder put it in 1994, such a policy would allow one to
“pocket the gains when good fortune runs our way” and to “chip away at
the already-low inﬂation rate” (Blinder, 1994, 4 as quote in Orphanides and
Wilcox, 2002).
4.3.3. The Low Inﬂation Equilibrium
In the late 1990s, both the implicit target and actual inﬂation remain in
the 1-2% range. This low inﬂation is consistent with the view that very low
inﬂation is desirable. At the 1996 Jackson Hole Symposium, a distinguished
group of central bankers, academics,and ﬁnancial market representatives
met to discuss policies for achieving price stability and agreed that low or
zero inﬂation was the appropriate goal for monetary policy.
There was, however, disagreement about whether a little inﬂation should
be tolerated. Speciﬁcally, Stanley Fischer and Lawrence Summers argued
that it was best to target an inﬂation rate in the 1-3% range, while other
conference participants argued that a lower target in the 0-2% range was
preferable.16
4.3.4. The Deﬂation Scare
16For a summary of the symposium, see George A. Kahn (1996).ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 19
During the 2001 to 2004 period, Figure 3 suggests that the implicit inﬂa-
tion target has drifted upwards into the 2 to 3% range. This econometric
ﬁnding is intuitive given the pronouncements of policymakers and the rec-
ommendations of inﬂuential academic papers at the time.
With inﬂation near one percent and the economy in recession in 2001,
avoiding deﬂation and a Japan-style liquidity trap became an important
consideration at the Fed. Governor Bernanke (2002) and Bernanke and
Reinhart (2004) explain that the Fed can avoid deﬂation by oﬀering a com-
mitment to the public “to keep the short rate low for a longer period than
previously expected” (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004).
As Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) explain, committing to an unusually
long period of low interest rates is equivalent to a temporary increase in the
time-varying inﬂation target. The inﬂation target rises above the level that
is optimal under normal circumstances and only declines once the economy
has experienced a boom and a period of higher inﬂation.17
4.4. Actual Versus Fitted Interest Rates
This section compares the actual fed funds rate, it with the estimated
target rate, i∗
t. Figure 4 shows that the rule estimated using the time-
varying parameter model ﬁts the actual path of the fed funds rate well over
the entire 1979-2004 period.18
17Speciﬁcally, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) recommend that the central bank target
the (output-gap adjusted) price-level. However, as they explain, one can “equivalently
describe the policy in terms of a time-varying target for the gap-adjusted inﬂation rate”
(Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, 185).
18Note that the ﬁtted fed funds rate (not the estimated target rate) ﬁts the actual
interest rate almost exactly due to the high degree of interest rate inertia.20 DANIEL LEIGH
FIG. 4. Actual and Estimated Fed Funds Target Rate
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Constant r* and π *            
For comparison, Figure 4 also shows the estimated target for the fed funds
rate obtained using the canonical framework with constant π∗ and rn. The
Taylor rule response coeﬃcients using the canonical framework are very
similar to those in the time-varying parameter model. However, the target
rate tracks the actual fed funds rate less closely and the temporary deviations
are more notable.
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TABLE 2.
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Log Likelihood -63.7 −60.8 −67.9
This section discusses the robustness of the estimates of the Taylor rule
and of the implicit inﬂation target to diﬀerent values of (i) the initial implicit
target, π∗
0 and (ii) the signal-to-noise ratio, λ.
5.1. Alternative π∗
0
Here I report the results for three values of π∗
0 in 1979Q3: the baseline
value of 4%, a lower value of 2.5% and a higher value of 5.5%. In all three
cases, the signal-to-noise ratio is kept at the estimated value of λ =0 .15.
As Table 2 suggests, the Taylor rule parameters are similar for the three
values of π∗
0. As Figure 5 suggests, the paths of the time-varying target, π∗
t,
converge by the late 1980s.
5.2. Alternative λ
Here I report the results for three values of λ, the signal-to-noise ratio:
the baseline estimated value of λ =0 .15; the low end of the 90% conﬁdence
interval, λ =0 .06; and the high end of the 90% conﬁdence interval, λ =0 .51.22 DANIEL LEIGH
FIG. 5. Implicit Inﬂation Target for Diﬀerent π
∗
0
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0=5.5%           
In each case, the initial value of π∗
0 in 1979Q3 is 4%. As Table 3 suggests,
the Taylor rule parameters are similar for the three values of λ.A sF i g u r e
6 suggests, the three estimated targets follow similar paths.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have proposed a new method of estimating the implicit
inﬂation target of a central bank and how it varies over time. In applying
this method to U.S. monetary policy over the last 25 years, I ﬁnd that theESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 23
TABLE 3.
Robustness Analysis: Estimation Results for Diﬀerent λ
































Log Likelihood -63.7 −62.8 −66.3
Federal Reserve’s implicit target has varied substantially during this broadly
successful quarter century.
The analysis of π∗
t reveals four broad periods in recent monetary history:
(i) the Volcker disinﬂation (1979 until the early 1980s); (ii) the opportunistic
approach to disinﬂation (mid 1980s to early 1990s); (iii) the low inﬂation
equilibrium (late 1990s); and (iv) the deﬂation scare (2001-2004). The esti-
mated path of π∗
t during these four periods is corroborated by the qualitative
historical evidence.
This paper has focused on U.S. monetary policy. The analytical framework
can easily be adapted to estimating the implicit inﬂation target in other
countries. For example, Leigh (2004) considers how the implicit inﬂation
target varied in Japan during the 1990s. An interesting direction for future
research that I am actively pursuing is to investigate whether the implicit
inﬂation target is more stable in countries with an explicit inﬂation targeting
framework, such as the U.K., New Zealand and Sweden, than in countries
without an explicit numeric target, such as the U.S. and Japan.24 DANIEL LEIGH
FIG. 6. Implicit Inﬂation Target for Diﬀerent λ




















Actual                 
λ =0.06           
λ =0.15 (baseline)
λ =0.51           
APPENDIX
NATURAL RATE OF INTEREST
This appendix describes the Kalman ﬁlter approach for obtaining an es-
timate of the time-varying natural rate, rn
t , as in Laubach and Williams
(2003). The two basic identifying assumptions are that (i) the output gap
converges to zero if the real rate gap is zero and (ii) the change in inﬂation
converges to zero if the output gap is zero.ESTIMATING THE REVEALED INFLATION TARGET 25
The ﬁrst assumption is formalized by the following I.S. equation:
yt = y∗
t + Ay(L)(yt−1 − y∗
t−1)+Ar(L)(rt−1 − rn
t−1)+ 1,t (A.1)
where yt is the log of GDP and y∗
t is the log of potential GDP. The diﬀerence
between actual and potential GDP, i.e. yt −y∗
t is the output gap. Term  1,t
denotes a mean zero i.i.d. normal shock to output.
The second assumption is formalized by the following Phillips curve:
πt = Bπ(L)πt−1 + By(L)(yt−1 − y∗
t−1)+Bπ(L)xt +  2,t (A.2)
where xt denotes the data matrix containing the relative oil and non-oil
import price inﬂation series. The inﬂation rate depends on lags of inﬂation
with the unity sum restriction on the coeﬃcients, relative oil and non-oil im-
port price inﬂation, and the output gap. Thus, stable inﬂation is consistent
with both the real interest rate and output equaling their respective natural
rates. The term  2,t denotes a mean zero i.i.d. normal shock to output.
The unobserved state variables are modelled as follows. The natural rate
of interest evolves according to
rn
t = cgt + zt (A.3)
where c is a constant term, gt is the unobserved trend in productivity growth,
and zt is a stochastic drift term that follows the process
zt = Dz(L)zt−1 +  4,t (A.4)
LW report results for a baseline case where zt is a random walk, so that
zt = zt−1 +  4,t, as well as for the case where zt is stationary. I use the26 DANIEL LEIGH
simpler baseline case. Consequently, the natural rate of interest follows a
random walk.
Potential output grows at rate gt so that
y∗
t = y∗
t−1 + gt−1 +  5,t (A.5)
Finally, LW assume that the trend growth rate, gt, follows a random walk,
gt = gt−1 +  6,t (A.6)
LW estimate equations A.1 through A.6 using maximum likelihood and
the Kalman ﬁlter to yield (a) estimates of the model parameters, and (b)
estimates of the time-varying paths of the unobserved state variables. LW
apply this approach to the 1961Q1 to 2002Q1 sample. I extend the sample
to 2004Q1 and estimate the equations using the 1961Q1 to 2004Q1 period.
The advantage of conducting the estimation over this long sample is that I
do not need to initialize rn
t in 1979Q3.
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